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Note 
The Folly of the Famous Family: Why Matter of 
L-E- A-’s Definition of Distinction Does Not Merit 
Deference 
DANIELLE L. SCHMALZ FULLAM 
Attorney General Barr abruptly changed the course of asylum law in the 
United States on July 29, 2019, in his decision in Matter of L-E-A-. Barr 
declared that usually, family-based, particular social group asylum claims 
would fail due to a lack of specific social distinction. Essentially, Barr 
decided that in order to constitute a cognizable particular social group, a 
family would have to be well-known within the society in question. While 
social distinction has been a component of asylum law jurisprudence for 
some time, never before was there the requirement of specific social 
distinction. Despite making a major change to asylum law, Barr offered little 
support for his argument, and the explanation he did provide is grounded in 
a misunderstanding and misquoting of case law; his decision is arbitrary 
and capricious. While Barr was acting within his authority as Attorney 
General and head of the Board of Immigration Appeals when he issued this 
decision, he was clearly motivated by a political agenda. This decision is yet 
another attack on immigrant families and will negatively impact hundreds 
of thousands of claims, especially those of unaccompanied children. In the 
interest of justice and the balance of powers, courts should use their power 
of judicial review to hold that Barr’s decision does not merit deference 
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The Folly of the Famous Family: Why Matter of L-E-
A-’s Definition of Distinction Does Not Merit 
Deference 
DANIELLE L. SCHMALZ FULLAM * 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 29, 2019, there was a significant and abrupt change in asylum 
law. Previously, there had been well-established precedent that the nuclear 
family members of a named individual would usually meet all of the 
requirements necessary to constitute a particular social group for purposes 
of requesting asylum.1 Attorney General Barr’s decision in Matter of 
L-E-A- abruptly changed this precedent and attacked the particular social 
group of nuclear family members of named individuals due to a lack of 
specific social distinction.2 
This Note will argue that federal courts should not consider Matter of 
L-E-A- a reasonable agency decision, and as such, courts are not required to 
defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA” or “the Board”) decision 
under the Chevron doctrine. While courts may be tempted to avoid grappling 
with the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of L-E-A-, courts should use 
their power-balancing authority to voice the fact that the decision is 
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the statute. 
I will begin by explaining basic principles of asylum law and the 
framework of the BIA’s authority, both of which are essential for 
understanding the argument. Next, I will discuss the development of the 
particular social group theory, beginning with its domestic origin in 1985. I 
will then examine the application of the particular social group theory to 
nuclear families and tribal clans throughout the years, leading up to the state 
of caselaw at the time of Barr’s decision. Next, I will introduce Matter of 
L-E-A-, both the BIA’s decision in 2017 and the Attorney General’s decision 
in 2019. This will lead to an exploration of the relevance of the decision and 
the impact it has had. Matter of L-E-A- will be examined under both Chevron 
steps, revealing that courts should find Barr’s decision to be arbitrary and 
capricious. Courts should determine that Matter of L-E-A- does not merit 
 
*J.D. 2021, University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A. 2017, State University of New York 
College at Geneseo. Thank you to Professor Valeria Gomez for sharing her time and expertise as the 
faculty supervisor for this research, and to Professor Jon Bauer for his valued feedback. Thank you to the 
entire CONN. L. REV. team for their edits. Finally, a warm thank you to my family and friends for their 
support and encouragement throughout law school. 
1 See discussion infra Section V.C: Nuclear Families.  
2 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (2019). 
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deference due to the folly of the famous family: Barr’s incorrect conclusion 
that specific families must be socially distinct. 
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ASYLUM LAW 
Unlike many other areas of law, our modern domestic asylum law results 
from our international obligations; Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 
to ensure that domestic law complied with our international obligations 
under the 1967 United Nations Protocol.3 The term “refugee” was first 
defined at the United Nations Refugee Convention in 1951 (“UN 
Convention” or “1951 Convention”) in the aftermath of World War II.4 The 
key legal principle was non-refoulement, meaning refugees could not be 
forced to return to their countries of origin where their lives were in danger.5 
The United Nation’s definition of a refugee is any person who: 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.6 
In 1967, the United Nations Refugee Protocol (“UN Protocol” or “1967 
Protocol”) extended the definition of a refugee beyond the temporal and 
geographical limitations of the 1951 Convention.7 The United States signed 
on to the UN Protocol in 1968, officially obligating itself to comply with the 
international law concept of non-refoulement.8 After the signing of the UN 
Protocol, U.S. asylum policy was still ad hoc, prompting Congress to pass 
the Refugee Act in 1980, where the United States formally codified in statute 
the UN’s definition of a refugee:9 
 
3 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). 
4 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1, 3 (2011), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-
us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html. 
5 The Choices Program, Timeline of Major Refugee and Asylum Laws and Policies, BROWN UNIV. 
DEP’T HIST., https://www.choices.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Seeking-Asylum_-Timeline-
Revised.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).  
6 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES 1, 14 (2010), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.  
7 Id. at 4. The Holocaust motivated the United Nations to protect populations that were being 
persecuted for a fundamental characteristic, such as religion. With the Holocaust in mind, the Convention 
initially limited the definition of a refugee as someone who was European and experienced persecution 
prior to 1951. Id. at 2. 
8 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37. 
9 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 201, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980); 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1980) [hereinafter INA].  
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The term “refugee” means any person who is outside any 
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person 
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such 
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling 
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of, that country because of 
persecution10 or a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.11 
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice 
issued implementing regulations, codified mainly in 8 C.F.R. § 208.1, et seq 
and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.1, et seq. To meet the Immigration and Nationality Act’s 
(“INA”) definition of a refugee, it is generally the asylum applicant’s burden 
to prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence.12 The elements 
are as follows: 
(1) The applicant must be outside of his or her country of origin and 
in the United States or at a U.S. port of entry.13 
(2) The persecution must be: 
(a) Harm suffered or feared that is severe enough to rise to 
the level of persecution.14 
(b) The government in the country of origin must be unable 
or unwilling to protect the individuals from persecution.15 
For example, if an individual could have gone to the 
police and police action would have mitigated the 
situation, this element will likely not be met. 
(c) There must be a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
(i) The Supreme Court held in Cardoza-Fonseca 
that even if there were just a one in ten chance 
of persecution, the odds of persecution would 
constitute a well-founded fear.16 
(ii) If an applicant shows she has already suffered 
persecution, it raises a rebuttable presumption of 
 
10 Note how the United States largely adopted the definition from the United Nations Convention 
but added “because of persecution,” which indicates past persecution alone could be the basis for asylum 
in the U.S. 
11 INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (1980). 
12 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2019). 
13 Id. An asylum-seeker in the United States does not include all people outside of their countries 
of origin—it only includes people who are inside the United States or at a U.S. port of entry. For the 
purposes of this paper, I will be dealing exclusively with the asylum system, so any references to a 
“refugee” will refer to asylum-seekers only. 
14 Korablina v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998). 
15 Navas v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000). 
16 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). 
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well-founded fear of future persecution.17 If an 
applicant proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she suffered persecution in the past, 
the burden shifts to the Government to show that 
the fear of future persecution is not well-founded, 
due to changed circumstances, for example.18   
(d) There must be nexus between the protected ground and 
the persecution.19 To establish that an applicant is subject 
to persecution on account of one of the five protected 
grounds listed above, the applicant bears the burden of 
proving the causal connection between the protected 
class and the persecution, meaning the well-founded fear 
of persecution must be a direct consequence of membership 
in a protected class.20 It is the applicant’s burden to prove 
this with evidence.21 There could be mixed motives for 
persecution, as long as one central reason for the 
persecution is a protected ground.22 
Additionally, there are mandatory bars to asylum, meaning even if the 
above definition of a refugee is met and proved, asylum can be denied.23 
These mandatory bars also originate from the UN Convention and its 1967 
Protocol.24 An asylum-seeker is ineligible for asylum if she: (1) engaged in 
the persecution of others; (2) was convicted of a particularly serious crime 
and is considered a danger to the United States; (3) committed a serious 
nonpolitical crime outside the United States; (4) poses a threat to the security 
of the United States; or (5) has been firmly resettled in another country 
before arriving to the United States.25 
 
17 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2019). 
18 Id.  
19 INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1980). 
20 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)–(2) (2019). 
21 Id. 
22 8 C.F.R. § 158 (b)(1)(B)(i) (2019). 
23 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (b)(2)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193). Note, there are two forms 
of relief from deportation that derive from the Refugee Convention: (1) asylum and (2) withholding of 
removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006). Both conform with our most basic international obligations 
not to return those who meet the definition of a refugee to their home countries if return would result in 
persecution. Asylum goes further than withholding of removal by allowing a pathway to lawful 
permanent resident status and eventually naturalization, so asylees must additionally convince 
adjudicators that they merit positive exercise of discretion—in other words, that they are deserving of the 
rights that come with asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2019). Withholding of removal provides the 
obligatory protection from deportation and a work permit, but no pathway to lawful permanent resident 
or citizen status. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006). Withholding of removal is mandatory, not discretionary 
like asylum, as required by the 1967 Protocol. For purposes of this Note, however, the particular social group 
analysis is the same for asylum and withholding of removal, because both require nexus. 
24 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 4. 
25 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (B)(2)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193). 
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II. FRAMEWORK OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS’ AUTHORITY 
A. The Attorney General’s Regulatory Power 
Congress designated the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) as the agencies to administer the 
immigration and refugee-processing functions described in the statutes.26 
Within the Department of Justice, there is the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and within EOIR, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals.27 
FIGURE 1 – United States Immigration Agencies28 
 
 
The BIA’s published decisions have binding effect on immigration 
courts and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).29 
The attorney general has authority deriving from the INA, which includes 
the ability to make determinations and rulings,30 certify cases for his or her 
 
26 Executive Office for Immigration Review: An Agency Guide, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download. DHS is tasked with  
adjudicating claims of asylum-seekers who are not in immigration enforcement (removal) proceedings. DOJ 
is tasked with adjudicating claims of people encountered at a port of entry or in removal proceedings. 
27 Organization Chart, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 27, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/organization-chart. 
28 Id. 
29 Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy 
Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 920 (2016).  
30 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2018). 
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review sua sponte,31 and issue decisions binding on all asylum 
adjudicators.32 This power exists regardless of how much time has passed 
since a BIA decision or how federal courts have already interpreted and 
applied that decision.33 
B. Balance of Power Between the Executive & Judicial Branches 
Agency determinations are subject to judicial review.34 While federal 
courts must usually defer to agency decisions, there are some important 
limitations. Judicial review is especially important as a power-checking 
mechanism here because the BIA decisions have more of a sweeping effect 
on policy than decisions from a court. The Supreme Court explained, “legal 
lapses and violations occur, and especially so when they have no 
consequence. That is why [courts have for] so long applied a strong 
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.”35 
C. Chevron Deference 
One concept in the law governing the relationship between 
administrative agencies and federal courts is the Chevron doctrine.36 The 
doctrine outlines when federal courts must defer to an agency interpretation 
of a statute and when courts can overrule an agency’s interpretation.37  
Three years after Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly stated in 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca that Chevron applied to the INA’s asylum and 
withholding provisions.38 While other statutes and legal concepts address the 
relationship between immigration agencies and federal courts, this Note 
focuses on the Chevron doctrine because it deals with federal court 
deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the Refugee Act’s term, “particular 
social group.” 
 
31 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2020). 
32 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(g)–(h)(1)(ii) (2020). Determining whether Congress has delegated 
interpretative authority to an agency and whether the agency is utilizing this power are necessary 
requirements that are sometimes referred to as Chevron Step Zero because they are prerequisites to 
applying Chevron deference. Motion Picture Assoc. of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 
2002); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 813 (2002). 
33 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(g)–(h)(1)(ii) (2020).  
34 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–
06 (2018). 
35 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (internal citation omitted).  
36 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837–38 (establishing what is now referred to as the Chevron doctrine). 
37 Id. at 843. 
38 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987); Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of 
Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 133 (2019). 
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D. The Steps of Chevron Analysis 
(1) First Step: An agency’s authority to implement and administer 
laws must come from Congress, so an integral first step of 
Chevron includes determining whether Congress indicated how 
a particular term should be interpreted.39 When congressional 
intent for statutory interpretation is clear, both courts and 
administrative agencies must follow it.40 Courts can disregard 
an agency’s interpretation if it is contrary to clear congressional 
intent. Courts use a number of canons of construction to 
determine congressional intent,41 including a review of the plain 
language of the statute, the structure of the statute, and the 
legislative history.42 If congressional intent is clear, that is the 
end of Chevron analysis. 
(2) Second Step: “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue [and an agency has issued a 
decision], the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”43 
In defining whether an interpretation is permissible, courts 
employ an “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute” analysis.44 A court is not bound to an agency’s decision 
if it determines, after engaging in the above-described analysis, 
that the decision is unreasonable.45 Review of agency action 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard can include other 
factors besides the reasonableness of an agency decision, such 
as reliance interests or whether the departure from prior policy 
was adequately explained.46 
Even when courts desire to hold differently than the agency did in its 
determination, or when a court’s prior decision conflicts with the agency’s 
 
39 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
40 Id. 
41 See, e.g., id. at 863–64 (using context as a tool for determining statutory intent). 
42 LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 
RECENT TRENDS 43–45 (2014), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. 
43 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
44 Id. at 844. The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) does not apply to immigration courts. 
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306 (1955) (describing various legislative enactments to clarify 
congressional intent and the exclusion of removal proceedings from the APA requirements); Catherine 
Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 13 (2018). 
45 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
46 See  Grace v. Barr, No. 19-5013, 2020 WL 4032652, at *18 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (describing part of 
the agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious on the ground that it marked a change in policy without 
demonstrating “reasoned decisionmaking”); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 64 (2011) (holding that the 
BIA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was “unmoored from the purposes and concerns 
of the immigration laws” and was not supported by relevant considerations); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (explaining that the Acting Secretary’s failure 
to discuss an important aspect of the problem is reason alone to render the decision concerning DACA 
arbitrary and capricious).  
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subsequent determination, courts must engage in Chevron analysis to 
determine whether the agency’s interpretation merits deference.47 “If a 
statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is 
reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s 
construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what 
the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”48 Thus the bar for a 
court deferring to an agency decision is relatively low; the standard is 
reasonableness, not necessarily agreement. 
Courts are required to engage in Chevron analysis even when an agency 
decision contradicts a court’s prior decision. In National Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X, the court of appeals did not conduct 
a Chevron analysis, concluding that its previous decision on the matter had 
established precedent prior to the agency’s decision, and, therefore, it did 
not need to defer to the agency’s new decision.49 The Supreme Court held 
that this was erroneous, and where Congress has been silent or ambiguous 
on a matter, agency decisions have the ability to reverse a court’s precedent 
so long as the agency’s determination is reasonable.50 The Supreme Court 
clarified, “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an 
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous 
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”51 The 
Court credited Chevron for establishing “a presumption that Congress, when 
it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, 
understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the 
agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever 
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”52  
An agency’s authority to fill statutory gaps exists even when an agency 
makes a determination that is inconsistent with its prior determinations.53 
“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s 
interpretation under the Chevron framework.”54 
E. How Courts Have Engaged in Chevron Analysis in Recent Years 
In the past few years, certain Justices of the Supreme Court have opined 
that federal courts have been too deferential to agencies in their application 
of the Chevron doctrine. Justice Kennedy, for example, has lamented the 
cursory nature with which circuit courts have applied the Chevron analysis: 
 
47 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
48 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
49 Id. at 982. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N. A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)). 
53 Id. at 981. 
54 Id. 
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In Urbina v. Holder, [sic] for example, the court stated, 
without any further elaboration, that “we agree with the BIA 
that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous.” It then 
deemed reasonable the BIA’s interpretation of the statute, “for 
the reasons the BIA gave in that case.” This analysis suggests 
an abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in interpreting 
federal statutes.55 
Justice Kennedy further suggested that an appropriate future case could 
present a ripe opportunity to reexamine the premises that underlie Chevron 
and the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, echoing the concerns 
of other members of the Court, specifically Justice Thomas and Justice 
Gorsuch.56 Because Justice Kennedy retired shortly after writing this 
concurrence57 and these were some of his last words on the bench, some 
legal observers placed additional emphasis on his statements and 
hypothesized that this was a pressing issue for Justice Kennedy. 
Chevron has been critiqued for its difficult and complicated 
implementation.58 Experts have also questioned whether it is appropriate to 
engage in Chevron deference for immigration cases; perhaps Congress 
intended courts to engage in robust review, as opposed to deferring to the 
BIA and Attorney General, given the importance of immigration law.59 
Chevron remains the law for judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretation, however, and courts have a duty to engage in thorough 
analysis as a means of preserving the balance of power. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP THEORY 
The drafters of the UN Protocol and Convention added the particular 
social group (“PSG”) ground after the initial drafting of the other protected 
grounds, and intentionally left the PSG ground vaguer than the other 
categories, in the hopes of protecting groups that the Convention could not 
foresee or identify at the time of the drafting.60 When asylum adjudicators 
began implementing the Refugee Act and interpreting the meaning of PSG, 
international jurisprudence construing the definition of a PSG was sparse, 
 
55  Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Urbina v. 
Holder, 745 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 2014)). 
56 Id. at 2121. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, regarding Auer deference, 
has further called into question the fate of Chevron deference, but for now, Chevron remains the law. 39 
S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
57 Robinson Meyer, Justice Kennedy’s Retirement Could Reshape the Environment, ATLANTIC 
(June 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/kennedys-departure-could-
reshape-the-environment/563930/. 
58 Sweeney, supra note 38, at 148.  
59 Id. at 128. 
60 Brienna Bagaric, Revisiting the Definition of Particular Social Group in the Refugee Convention 
& Increasing the Refugee Quota as a Means of Ameliorating the International Displaced Person’s Crisis, 
69 S.C. L. REV. 121, 151 (2017). 
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requiring that U.S. agencies further develop PSG theory in domestic law.61 
As the Board has remarked, “[t]he concept is even more elusive because 
there is no clear evidence of legislative intent”62 and “[r]ead in its broadest literal 
sense, the phrase is almost completely open-ended. Virtually any set including 
more than one person could be described as a ‘particular social group.’”63 
A. Innate & Immutable Characteristics 
In 1985, the Board of Immigration Appeals addressed the meaning of 
PSG, for the first time in the landmark case Acosta.64 The Board used a well-
established doctrine for statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, meaning 
“of the same kind.”65 Given that membership in a PSG was listed with the 
other four protected grounds for asylum, the doctrine of ejusdem generis 
holds that the specific words in question should be interpreted in a manner 
that is consistent with the other words in the list.66 The Board reasoned that 
the other four protected grounds constituted groups of people with 
characteristics that were immutable, meaning the characteristics were so 
fundamental to personal identity that they could not change or should not 
have to be changed.67 The Board expanded on acceptable shared 
characteristics that could form the basis of a PSG: “[t]he shared 
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in 
some circumstances . . . a shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership.”68 
After Acosta, presenting a PSG claim became a multi-step process. 
Once a group is established that consists of members who share 
immutable characteristics, the applicant must show that he or she is a 
member of that group.69 The applicant must then show that the reason he or 
she was being persecuted was because of his or her membership in that 
group (the nexus requirement).70  
The Board decided that this immutable characteristic analysis should 
take place on a case-by-case basis.71 At the time of this decision, issued only 
five years after Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, few 
asylum-seekers asserted claims on the basis of membership in a particular 
 
61 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985). “Congress did not indicate what it 
understood this ground of persecution [PSG] to mean, nor is its meaning clear in the Protocol.” Id. 
62 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 230 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 594 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
63 Id. (citing Fatin v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
64 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 212. 




69 INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (1980). 
70 Id.  
71 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.  
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social group.72 The case-by-case approach allowed adjudicators maximum 
flexibility in considering the unique aspects of any given case, but it also led 
to confusion and inconsistencies, especially as the number of claims based 
on a respondent’s membership in a particular social group increased.73  
B. Additional Requirements 
In 2006, citing inconsistency in immigration court decisions and 
requests from federal courts for more clarity, the Board introduced the 
elements of social distinction74 and particularity to the definition of a 
particular social group.75 Thus, in order to present a cognizable particular 
social group, an applicant must propose a group that not only is immutable, 
but also socially distinct and particular. In justifying the new requirements, 
the Board looked to the Guidelines of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees.76 The Board noted that the UN had always 
required that particular social groups be socially visible by stating that 
“persecutory action toward a group may be a relevant factor in determining 
the visibility of a group in a particular society.”77 The Board also reviewed 
its previous decisions and determined that, although not expressly using the 
term social visibility/distinction, it already required that particular social 
groups possess characteristics that were “recognizable by others in the 
country in question.”78  
Although the BIA did not state particularity as an element in its holding 
in In re C-A-, it made a finding of particularity in dicta: “We find that this 
group [‘former noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug 
cartel’79] is too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity.”80 
In 2008, the Board definitively held that there were now three 
requirements to meet the definition of a particular social group—shared 
immutable characteristics, social distinction, and particularity.81 In 2014, 
nearly thirty years after Matter of Acosta, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
reaffirmed the standards first established in Matter of Acosta and clarified 
 
72 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 231 (B.I.A. 2014).  
73 Id.  
74 At the time, the BIA and the United Nations referred to social distinction as “social visibility.” 
The Board subsequently changed the term to “social distinction” to emphasize that social distinction does 
not necessarily require literal, ocular visibility. Id. at 240. 
75 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006). 
76 Id. at 960. 
77 Id. (citing to U.N. HIGH COMM’R OF REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: 
“MEMBERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 
CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, HCR/GIP/02/02 
para.14 (2002), https://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION]). 
78 Id. at 960. 
79 Id. at 951. 
80 Id. at 957. 
81 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582–83 (B.I.A. 2008). 
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the amended social distinction and particularity standards in two cases 
decided on the same day.82 The Board summarized its prior case law, stating: 
[A]n applicant for asylum or withholding of removal seeking 
relief based on “membership in a particular social group” must 
establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share 
a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with 
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in 
question.83 
C. Social Distinction 
The social distinction analysis centers on one main question—does the 
society in question view the proposed group as a class?84 The perception of 
the society in question, and not just the perception of the persecutor, determines 
whether a social group is recognized for asylum purposes.85 The Board also 
requires that the social distinction requirement is met without circular 
reasoning; the group must not be defined solely by the harm it may suffer.86  
D. Particularity  
“A particular social group must be defined by characteristics that 
provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group. . . . 
The group must also be discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not 
be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”87 Typically adjectives like 
“wealthy” and “young” are too broad to pass the particularity test.88 In most 
cases, this is because if people from the same country of origin were asked 
to define who is “wealthy” and “young,” their answers would vary widely. 
E. Social Distinction & Particularity Critiques 
For almost twenty years, the immutability standard was the only 
defining element that the BIA identified for determining whether a proposed 
group was a cognizable particular social group for purposes of asylum. The 
requirements of social distinction and particularity have been criticized for 
numerous reasons. First, the requirements are somewhat redundant; as the 
Board itself has stated, “particularity” is included in the plain language of 
 
82 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
208, 210–11 (B.I.A. 2014). 
83 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237.  
84 Id. at 240. 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 242. 
87 Id. at 239. 
88 See, e.g., In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008). While some general principles emerge, there is always a case-by-case 
analysis that requires evidentiary support. A group that lacks particularity in one case may be found to 
be sufficiently particular in another. 
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the Act and is, by nature, part of the term “particular social group.”89 Second, 
the requirements have been critiqued for being unworkable at times when 
applied together. Deborah Anker, an author and the founder and director of 
Harvard Law School’s Immigration and Refugee Clinic,90 explained:  
Another issue presented by the particularity and social 
distinction requirements is the difficulty of simultaneously 
meeting both. A category such as “youth” may meet the social 
distinction requirement because society recognizes youth as a 
distinct group, but fail the particularity requirement because 
“youth” has no strict, objective boundaries. If “youth” were 
more precisely defined as those aged 12–25, however, then the 
grouping may fail the social distinction requirement because 
the society may not perceive that specific age range as a 
distinct category. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit rejected such a 
PSG in Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder.91 
Additionally, the fact that a particular social group must be viewed as 
socially distinct by society is problematic because persecutors could see a 
segment of the population as distinct, despite the lack of recognition from 
society as a whole.92 Society as a whole may not recognize a group due to 
ignorance or hate, leaving a segment of the population unprotected.  
After the announcement of the two new requirements, some courts of 
appeals rejected the additional standards; the Seventh and Third Circuits 
initially held that the new standards were vague and unjustified.93 These 
courts especially pushed back at the Board’s assertion that the requirements 
had always been a tacit part of the Board’s analysis and that the groups 
recognized as particular social groups in earlier cases would meet the new 
particularity and social distinction requirements.94 Other federal courts 
deferred to the agency decision or accepted it without analysis.95 
 
89 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239. 
90 Deborah Anker, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10024/Anker (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2020). 
91 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 5:43 (2020 ed.) (citing Rivera-
Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650, 653 (10th Cir. 2012)). 
92 Id. Refugee law aims to protect an individual from persecution when she enjoys no protection from 
her state due to a fundamental breakdown of the relationship between an individual and her state. Whether 
society as a whole recognized a group as socially distinct was not originally part of this equation. Id. 
93 Fatma E. Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 391, 422–24 (2013); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009); Valdiviezo-
Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604, 616 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit eventually 
adopted the new standards. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 539–40 (3d. Cir. 2018). 
94 Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16; Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604, 616. 
95 Marouf, supra note 93, at 422–24; see, e.g., Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 
2010); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 994 
(6th Cir. 2009) (illustrating the adoption of the new standards by several circuit courts without robust analysis). 
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IV. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP THEORY APPLIED 
A. Tribal Clans 
In In re H-, the Board found that tribal clans and subclans could be 
cognizable particular social groups.96 The applicant presented a claim based 
on his membership in the Darood clan and Marehan subclan of Somalia, 
which he showed was targeted by the members of the United Somali 
Congress or Hawiye clan.97 The subclan shared ties of kinship and identifiable 
linguistic commonalities.98 The “ties of kinship” were an immutable 
characteristic and the linguistic differences made the subclan socially 
distinct in Somalia.99 Somalis could recognize members of the Marehan 
subclan.100 The subclan was also particular, as the kinship ties and linguistic 
differences made it clear who was in the subclan and who was not.101 
B. Family-Based Particular Social Groups Found Not to Meet the Legal 
Standard 
At times, family-based particular social groups claims have been 
unsuccessful due to the failure to show particularity, social distinction, or a 
nexus between the proposed group and the harm. In Matter of S-E-G-, the 
asylum-seekers proposed a claim based on two particular social groups: “(1) 
Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13 
and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on their own 
personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities; 
and (2) family members of such Salvadoran youth.”102 The BIA wrote, “the 
‘proposed group of “family members,” which could include fathers, mothers, 
siblings, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, grandparents, cousins, and others, is 
. . . too amorphous a category.’”103 This particular social group failed the 
particularity element. Further, the Board held that the adjective “youth” in 
the first proposed group was not immutable, because by nature, age changes, 
and one does not stay “young” forever.104 Because the second group was 
based on the characteristic of shared kinship ties to the first particular social 
group presented, the second group also failed the immutability element. 
Notably, the group did not fail on social distinction grounds. 
 
96 See generally In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 338 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that Applicant H’s subclan 
constituted a particular social group). 
97 Id. at 337, 344. 
98 Id. at 343. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
102 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (B.I.A. 2008). 
103 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 593 (Att’y Gen. 2019) (citing to Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. 
& N. Dec. at 585). 
104 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 583. 
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C. Nuclear Families 
Prior to Matter of L-E-A-, the BIA recognized many particular social 
groups based on the shared characteristic of kinship ties because these 
groups satisfied the three elements of a particular social group: immutability, 
social distinction, and particularity. In Matter of Acosta, the BIA explicitly 
listed particular social groups with the shared characteristic of “kinship ties” 
as an example of an immutable characteristic that could define a valid 
particular social group.105 Groups where members share kinship ties have 
been considered a PSG since the Board made an effort to define and clarify 
“particular social group” as a term in 1985.106 In re C-A-, the first case in 
which the BIA announced the additional requirement of social distinction, 
also reaffirmed family relationships as a characteristic that could be the basis 
of a PSG.107 
While discussing social distinction, the BIA stated that “[s]ocial groups 
based on innate characteristics such as . . . family relationship are generally 
easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social groups.”108 
Prior to Attorney General Barr’s decision in Matter of L-E-A-, families were 
considered to be socially distinct in many communities, although social 
distinction was evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration 
the reference community (i.e., the applicant’s country of origin). For 
reference purposes, the United States is an example of a country where 
nuclear families are socially distinct. “The United States has family-based 
immigration status, family law, and family-size bags of chips. It shapes its 
laws, communities, and even schools around the concept of family because 
it recognizes that family is a special, socially distinct entity.”109 To gauge 
the social distinction of a nuclear family, one would ask whether the society 
in the applicant’s home country views the nuclear family as a group. When 
it is common practice in a society to use last names as familial associations 
and to ask people who look alike if they are related, it is an indication that 
the nuclear family is indeed socially distinct. 
Whether a family-based particular social group is particular largely 
depends on how the applicant frames his or her proposed group. For 
example, if an applicant states she belongs to the particular social group 
“children of Named Individual,” it would be clear who is in the group and 
who is out of the group.   
 
105 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
106 Id. 
107  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006).  
108 Id. 
109 Erin Liechty, No Fame Required: Where Matter of L-E-A- Went Wrong, REFLAW (Jan. 29, 
2020), http://www.reflaw.org/no-fame-required-where-matter-of-l-e-a-went-wrong/.  
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V. THE MATTER OF L-E-A- DECISION & THE RECOGNITION OF THE 
COGNIZABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY 
The BIA issued the Matter of L-E-A- decision in 2017, which recognized 
L-E-A-’s nuclear family claim.110 The decision was often cited when 
practitioners represented asylum applicants who also had a family-based claim. 
A. Facts of the Case 
The Respondent, referred to by his initials, L-E-A-, entered the United 
States without inspection in 1998.111 In May 2011, he voluntarily departed 
after being placed in removal proceedings by DHS due to an arrest for 
driving under the influence.112 Upon returning to Mexico, L-E-A- lived with 
his parents in Mexico City and helped run his father’s neighborhood general 
store.113 His father had refused to sell drugs out of his store for La Familia 
Michoacana, a Mexican drug cartel.114 About a week after returning to 
Mexico City, L-E-A- heard gun shots while walking in the street and 
dropped to the ground.115 He was not injured and was unsure if the shots 
were targeted at him or elsewhere.116 He did note, however, that the shots 
were coming from a black sport utility vehicle.117  
A week later, he saw the same black sport utility vehicle and four armed 
cartel members, who identified themselves as La Familia Michoacana; they 
asked L-E-A- if he would sell the cartel’s drugs out of his father’s store.118 
When L-E-A- refused, the cartel threatened him and told him to 
reconsider.119 Shortly after this incident, four masked cartel members in the 
same black sport utility vehicle tried to kidnap L-E-A-, but he successfully 
escaped.120 Upon arriving in the United States, he was apprehended and 
sought asylum as a defense at his removal hearing.121 He asserted that he 
was persecuted by a criminal gang due to his membership in the group 
consisting of the “‘immediate family of his father,’ who owned a store 
targeted by a local drug cartel.”122 The immigration judge denied relief to 
L-E-A-, holding “that the respondent had not shown he was the victim of 
anything more than criminal activity.”123 
 
110 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42–43 (B.I.A. 2017). 










121 Id.  
122 Id. at 581. 
123 Id. at 583. 
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B. The Board’s 2017 Decision 
L-E-A- appealed the decision, and, on appeal, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals found that L-E-A-’s proposed particular social group of the 
immediate family of his father was a cognizable particular social group.124 
DHS had not contested the cognizability of L-E-A-’s PSG in its briefing.125 
The Board reviewed the longstanding recognition of family ties as a shared 
characteristic for a particular social group but explained that “[n]ot all social 
groups that involve family members meet the requirements of particularity 
and social distinction.”126 The Board wrote: “In consideration of the facts of 
this case and the agreement of the parties, we have no difficulty identifying 
the respondent, a son residing in his father’s home, as being a member of the 
particular social group comprised of his father’s immediate family.”127 
The Board approved the social group but denied the Respondent’s 
asylum application because of the absence of the necessary nexus between 
his membership in his family group and the persecution.128 The Board held 
that the cartel could have targeted L-E-A- because of his access to the store 
and not because he was the immediate family of his father who owned the 
store.129 While L-E-A-’s claim ultimately failed due to nexus reasons, his 
case legitimized nuclear family particular social groups. 
Acting Attorney General Whitaker directed the Board of Immigration 
Appeals to refer the decision for his review in December 2018, which stayed 
the proceedings.130 In the meantime, Attorney General Barr took office and 
was the one to actually review the decision.131 
C. The Attorney General’s 2019 Decision 
In his decision, Barr upended the longstanding precedent on particular 
social groups in holding that most groups based on membership in nuclear 
families could not meet the social distinction requirement of a particular 
social group. Before Matter of L-E-A- was referred for attorney general 
review, no party had contested the cognizability of L-E-A-’s family-based 
PSG.132 Once the case was before Attorney General Barr, however, he wrote 
that “[a]ll particular social groups must satisfy the criteria set forth in Matter 
of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, and a proposed family-based group is 
 
124 Id. at 583–84. 
125 Id. 
126 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. &. N Dec. 40, 42–43 (B.I.A. 2017). 
127 Id. at 43. 
128 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 584. 
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 585. 
132 Id. at 584. 
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no different. An applicant must establish that his specific family group is 
defined with sufficient particularity and is socially distinct in his society.”133 
Attorney General Barr’s addition of the word “specific” changed 
everything. To support his proposition, he cited to Matter of A-B-,134 writing, 
“The fact that ‘nuclear families’ or some other widely recognized family unit 
generally carry societal importance says nothing about whether a specific 
nuclear family would be ‘recognizable by society at large.’”135 In looking to 
Matter of A-B- for support, the Attorney General swapped the word 
“classes” in Matter of A-B-’s original phrasing for the word “specific.”136 
The original language in Matter of A-B- read: “But the key thread running 
through the particular social group framework is that social groups must be 
classes recognizable by society at large.”137 This marked a significant and 
unsupported change. 
Attorney General Barr wrote that nearly every person belongs to a 
family in a society where families as a concept are significant.138 He sought 
to limit the number of cognizable particular social groups by stating that a 
shared characteristic most people have—kinship ties—failed the particular 
social group requirements. As Attorney General Barr himself recognized in 
his opinion, the new requirement of a specific family being socially distinct 
will mean that most families will not pass the requirements to constitute a 
particular social group.139 He explained that the ordinary family “will not 
have the kind of identifying characteristics that render the family socially 
distinct within the society in question.”140 He goes on to explain that “[t]he 
average family—even if it would otherwise satisfy the immutability and 
particularity requirements—is unlikely to be so recognized.”141 His decision 
means that only families that are famous, such as the Kardashian family, 
would be adequately socially distinct.142 
VI. IMPACT & RELEVANCE OF THE DECISION 
Some practitioners and scholars have emphasized that the Attorney 
General’s holding is narrow—simply, that the Board must conduct a more 
 
133 Id. at 586 (emphasis added). 
134 Id. at 594 (citing Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 336 (Att’y Gen. 2018)). In Matter of A-
B-, former Attorney General Sessions stated, “Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence 
or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.” 27 I. & N. at 320. 
135 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. at 594.  
136 Jeffrey S. Chase, L-E-A-: How Much Did the AG Change?, JEFFREY S. CHASE (Aug. 11, 2019), 
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/8/11/l-e-a-how-much-did-the-ag-change (quoting Matter of 
A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336). 
137 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 336 (emphasis added). See also Chase, supra note 136 (echoing 
the importance of the word “classes”).  
138 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 594. 
139 Id. at 586. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 594. 
142 Chase, supra note 136. 
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thorough analysis of particular social group claims even when DHS does not 
contest the proposed group.143 These commenters further argue that the more 
concerning statements—those predicting that most family-based particular 
social groups will fail to meet the particular social group requirements—are 
merely dicta.144 As such, these commenters contend that Barr’s opinion is 
not groundbreaking because dicta is not legally binding on courts. 
While technically Barr’s statements on most families failing the social 
distinction requirements may be classified as dicta, evidently, the Attorney 
General sought to drastically change particular social group theory. Agency 
dicta is powerful because agency “dicta can represent an articulation of its 
policy, to which it must adhere or adequately explain deviations.”145 The 
Attorney Generals’ agenda, commenced by Whitaker and executed by Barr, 
is plainly illustrated by the fact that the family-based particular social group 
was not an issue in L-E-A-’s case before it was referred for review by the 
Attorney General.  
This decision will change the course of asylum law for years to come. 
The decision will impact hundreds of thousands of claims, especially the 
cases of unaccompanied minors because unaccompanied minors often 
present family-based claims.146 This, at its core, constitutes yet another 
attack on immigrant families. While this attack through the Matter of 
L-E-A-decision has received far less media attention than some other attacks 
on immigrant families, like family separation at the border,147 the Matter of 
L-E-A- decision is perhaps even more impactful to immigrant families in the 
long run. 
With one decision, thirty-five years of case law—precedent that upheld 
most family-based claims as a quintessential particular social group—was 
eviscerated. This abrupt change to asylum law, especially given the 
misinterpretation of caselaw and misquoted caselaw, undermines the 
stability of this area of law. This lack of stability is especially problematic 
given attorney general turnover and the inevitability of different policy goals 
and leadership styles. Regardless of the frequency with which an attorney 
general refers cases to himself, if the Executive Branch is using its legitimate 
 
143 CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC., PRACTICE POINTER, MATTER OF L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. DEC. 
581 (A.G. 2019) 2–3 (2019), https://cliniclegal.org/file-download/download/public/367.  
144 Id. at 3. 
145 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 116 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Kidd Commc’ns v. FCC, 427 
F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
146 Isabela Dias, Persecution Based on Family Ties Will No Longer Qualify as Grounds for Asylum, 
the Attorney General Rules, PAC. STANDARD (July 29, 2019), https://psmag.com/news/persecution-
based-on-family-ties-will-no-longer-qualify-as-grounds-for-asylum.  
147 See Jasmine Aguilera, Here’s What to Know About the Status of Family Separation at the U.S. 
Border, Which Isn’t Nearly Over, TIME (Oct. 25, 2019, 2:49 PM), https://time.com/5678313/trump-
administration-family-separation-lawsuits/ (“Approximately 5,500 migrant children have been separated 
from their parents [at the border] by the Trump Administration . . . . [including] approximately 1,000 
children [who] have been separated from their parents since the practice was declared over by the Trump 
Administration in June 2018.”). 
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regulatory power, the Judicial Branch must balance that power by using its 
own legitimate power of judicial review in the form of the Chevron doctrine. 
VII. NECESSARY CIRCUIT COURT REACTIONS 
A. Motivating Factors 
In the interest of justice, the balance of powers, and the stability of 
asylum law, circuit courts must use their power to directly challenge 
Attorney General Barr’s decision in Matter of L-E-A-. While it may be 
possible to side-step the decision,148 a direct challenge is necessary and 
achievable under the Chevron doctrine.149 As Justice Kennedy warned, 
courts must not abdicate their authority to conduct judicial review,150 and 
robust analysis is necessary. The Judicial Branch has long prided itself for 
the role it plays in judicial review, reasoning as the Supreme Court did in 
1803, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of 
necessity expound and interpret that rule.”151  
Despite extensive existing circuit court case law on the validity of 
family-based particular social groups, Brand X requires courts to conduct a 
review under Chevron, even when, like here, agency decisions are 
inconsistent.152 Now that the Board has changed its precedent with the 
amendments made in Matter of L-E-A-, courts can review the Board’s 
amended interpretation of the INA. Courts should find the Matter of 
L-E-A-decision to be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the statute. 
B. Analyzing Matter of L-E-A- Under the First Step of Chevron 
Congressional intent surrounding the exact interpretation of particular 
social group is unclear. What is clear is that Congress defined the term 
“refugee” in the Refugee Act of 1980 to comply with its international 
obligations under the UN Protocol.153 While the United Nations did not 
explicitly define the term either, the Convention’s history shows that the 
particular social group ground was meant to be relatively undefined so it 
 
148 See Nolasco-Yok v. Barr, 801 F. App’x 800, 801 n.1 (1st Cir. 2020) (declining to consider Barr’s 
decision in L-E-A- despite the Respondent presenting an extensive argument on the matter because 
“neither the BIA nor the IJ relied on Matter of L-E-A-, and both assumed that family constitutes a 
particular social group under the Immigration & Nationality Act.”). 
149 Respondents argued in Matter of L-E-A- that the Attorney General did not have the jurisdiction 
to review the case. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 585 (Att’y Gen. 2019). This analysis will 
assume that the Attorney General did have the jurisdiction and power to review the case and will focus 
on critiquing the decision that was delivered. 
150 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
151 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
152 See supra Section III.D. 
153 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 219 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 
2021] THE FOLLY OF THE FAMOUS FAMILY 177 
would be malleable enough to protect groups in similar situations to the 
other four grounds.154 
Looking at how other countries have adopted the United Nations 
Protocol into their domestic law has been a helpful statutory construction 
tool for the Board, even though international interpretation is not binding on 
the United States.155 The Board also recognizes that while not controlling, 
UN publications may provide useful interpretive guidance.156 The United 
Nations Guidelines define a particular social group as: 
a group of persons who share a common characteristic other 
than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a 
group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is 
innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to 
identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.157 
In Matter of Acosta, the BIA executed its duty of defining the term 
“particular social group” domestically by using the tool of statutory 
construction; the Board applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis and 
concluded that PSG should be interpreted like the other four protected 
grounds: race, religion, nationality, and political opinion.158 But since 
Congress was silent regarding its intent for the definition of PSG, and the 
use of statutory construction tools do not resolve the ambiguity, the BIA has 
authority to interpret the meaning of PSG. 
C. Analyzing Matter of L-E-A- Under the Second Step of Chevron 
Since the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the meaning of 
“particular social group,” then the question for the court is whether the 
Attorney General’s latest decision on particular social group theory in Matter 
of L-E-A- is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute. Because 
Matter of L-E-A- is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the statute, courts 
must reject its interpretation of PSG as it applies to nuclear families. While 
not common, it is certainly not impossible for a court to overcome the second 
step of Chevron; one study found that of 817 agency statutory interpretations 
that advanced to step two, the agency lost in fifty-one of them.159 Interestingly, 
the most common subject area for an agency to lose was immigration, with 
nineteen agency interpretations, or 37.3% of the total interpretations, held to 
be arbitrary and capricious under the second step of Chevron.160 
 
154 GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 77, at para. 1.  
155 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 220. 
156 Id. at 211. 
157 GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 77, at para. 11. 
158 See supra Part III.  
159 Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Step Two’s Domain, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1441, 1461 (2018). 
160 Id. at 1462. 
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Attorney General Barr disingenuously claims to be anchoring his 
decision on established precedent. In reality, by omitting the word “classes” 
from the original wording in Matter of A-B- and replacing it with “specific,” 
Barr changes the law and departs from nearly thirty-five years of caselaw 
precedent since Matter of Acosta.161 A class is a collection of individuals 
that share a common attribute.162 The BIA itself has stated that family-based 
particular social groups are a natural fit within particular social group theory, 
doing so not just in Matter of Acosta, but in numerous decisions following 
that landmark case.163 Similarly, for decades, circuit courts have considered 
family-based claims valid particular social groups: former immigration 
judge Jeffrey Chase has noted that “the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all recognized that family can 
constitute a PSG, and all have reiterated that opinion in decisions issued in 
2014 or later.”164 For example, the First Circuit explained: 
There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group 
based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics 
than that of the nuclear family. Indeed, quoting the Ninth 
Circuit, we recently stated that “‘a prototypical example of a 
“particular social group” would consist of the immediate 
members of a certain family, the family being a focus of 
fundamental affiliational concerns and common interests for 
most people.’”165  
Against this backdrop, when L-E-A- presented a particular social group 
claim based on his immediate family, opposing counsel did not disagree.166 
This is unsurprising, given the longstanding acceptance of family-based 
PSGs spanning multiple jurisdictions and many decades. 
In Matter of L-E-A-, the Attorney General wrote that “the respondent 
did not show that anyone, other than perhaps the cartel, viewed the 
respondent’s family to be distinct in Mexican society.”167 Where did this 
need for individual family distinction come from? The Attorney General 
states that the social distinction test must be applied to the specific group 
presented by the asylum applicant, such as “immediate family members of 
[Named Individual],” and not the type of group, such as a nuclear family.168  
 
161 See supra Section IV.A. 
162 Definition of Class, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/class 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2020).  
163 See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 246 (B.I.A. 2014) (explicitly defining and 
explaining the particular social group elements and reiterating that the Board considers family 
relationships to be an innate characteristic that could form the basis of a particular social group).  
164 Chase, supra note 136. 
165 Gebremichael v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation 
omitted); see also Chase, supra note 136 (quoting the same language from Gebremichael). 
166 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581, 583–84. (Att’y Gen. 2019). 
167 Id. at 592. 
168 Id. at 594. 
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Barr’s interpretation is flawed. The very case that introduced the 
requirements of social distinction and particularity also reaffirmed that 
family ties could serve as a characteristic for a PSG.169 Under the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis, PSGs are supposed to be akin to the other four protected 
classes.170 “Thus when the requirements for ‘membership in a particular 
social group’ are consistent with the other grounds of persecution, the 
overall burdens are equivalent to those placed on applicants asserting claims 
based on the other grounds.”171 The Refugee Act allows an asylum applicant 
to name a protected class, so long as it fits the three requirements that will 
make it like the other protected classes.172 Naming a protected class as a PSG 
will often be broad; a nuclear family as a general concept is broad, just like 
religion as a general concept is broad. This is not to be confused with the 
applicant’s burden to explicitly state he is applying as the immediate family 
member of a named individual. In a society where the nuclear family is an 
important grouping, if society members were told that the asylum applicant 
lives with his spouse and children, the society members would immediately 
recognize it as a group: the nuclear family.173 There is no need for society 
members to personally know or recognize the name of the asylum applicant. 
Finally, we can consider a proof by contradiction. Assuming that social 
distinction is a requirement for the specific group that an individual belongs 
to, then an individual persecuted for their membership in a small religious 
cult, unknown to society at large, would not be eligible for asylum. We 
know, however, that religion as a general concept is a protected class; 
therefore, social distinction cannot be a requirement for specific subgroups 
within a protected class. 
To support his argument, the Attorney General stated that since every 
person has a family, the particular social group net is cast wider than 
Congress intended.174 The Attorney General did not consider the fact that 
Congress approved of other protected classes that are defined by 
characteristics that every person holds, such as race. Every person has a race, 
and most people also have a nationality, a religion, and a political opinion,175 
and yet the validity of these claims are never questioned. It is unclear, then, 
why the fact that most people have families has any bearing on the validity 
of a particular social group. 
Attorney General Barr took the basic guidelines that were supposed to 
apply to protected classes generally and replaced them with a hyper-concern 
 
169 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006). 
170 See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
171 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014). 
172 See discussion supra Part IV. 
173 The BIA has made it clear that social distinction does not require ocular visibility. See supra 
note 74. Therefore, it is not necessary to show that society is aware which particular individuals belong 
to a group. 
174 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 593 (Att’y Gen. 2019).  
175 Chase, supra note 136. 
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for individual examples of protected classes. Before Matter of L-E-A-, an 
asylum applicant had to show that his shared family ties with his proposed 
nuclear family group were immutable, socially distinct, and particular as a 
general matter in his country. He then had to show nexus by connecting the 
specific harm he suffered, or fears to suffer, to his membership in his specific 
family, in addition to all the other requirements. After Matter of L-E-A-, an 
asylum applicant must show that his specific family is immutable, socially 
distinct, and particular, and still show the nexus between the specific harm 
he suffered and his specific family. Barr essentially requires a family to be 
famous to meet the social distinction requirement. 
 Perhaps Barr’s goal was to emphasize the need to not take certain 
groups, like the nuclear family, for granted as per se valid particular social 
groups. Barr wrote that “[t]he Board here did not perform the required 
fact-based inquiry to determine whether the respondent had satisfied his 
burden of establishing the existence of a particular social group within the 
legal requirements of the statute.”176 Yet if this were merely the Attorney 
General’s aim, he could have remanded on this fact alone, instead of 
disrupting decades of Board and court precedent. 
The Attorney General did not elaborate on his new requirement and in 
doing so created more confusion. He did not explain the size or scope of the 
community wherein the family in question must be socially distinct. 
Communities can range from a small, local village to an entire country. 
Social distinction requirements of specific families would likely be met 
more easily if specific families only needed to be distinct within their local 
communities. Further, Barr provided no guidance on how to gauge how 
socially distinct a family must be in a given community. If 30% of a 
population knows of a family, is that enough? How can immigration judges 
even determine how much of a given population knows of a family without 
extensive polling? Can a family be well-known through politics, through 
entertainment, through wealth? Rather than provide direction for courts, 
Attorney General Barr has all but assured that courts implementing his 
decision will produce a hodgepodge of inconsistent rulings. Given the 
decision’s cryptic guidance and faulty reasoning, courts have no choice but 
to reject this opinion as arbitrary and capricious. 
The Attorney General’s conclusions in Matter of L-E-A- on 
Congressional intent for particular social group theory are misguided. Barr 
wrote, “[i]f Congress intended for refugee status to turn on one’s suffering 
of persecution ‘on account of’ family membership, Congress would have 
included family identity as one of the expressly enumerated covered grounds 
for persecution.”177 This statement is dismaying for multiple reasons. As 
previously discussed, Congress adopted the United Nation’s Protocol and 
 
176 Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 586. 
177 Id. at 593. 
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passed the Immigration and Nationality Act to comply with the Protocol.178 
Particular social group was intentionally drafted broadly to encompass 
people who were not initially considered at the United Nations Convention. 
Despite congressional intent’s material importance in statutory 
interpretation, the Attorney General wrote without acknowledging the 
history of the Act.  
The Attorney General’s decision in Matter of L-E-A- fails the second 
step of Chevron and courts should not defer to the agency decision. Courts 
should find Matter of L-E-A- arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the statute 
due to the faulty logic in the decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Matter of L-E-A- has negatively, swiftly, and irrationally changed 
asylum law in a drastic manner. Courts should use their judicial review 
power to highlight the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the ruling. Despite 
changing leaders in the Executive Branch, asylum law must stay true to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. Courts should determine that Matter of 
L-E-A- does not merit deference. In the meantime, thousands of 
family-based asylum applicants will suffer, marking yet another attack by 
the United States Government on the immigrant family. 
 
178 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436 (1987). 
 
 
 
